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Abstract
We study an exchange economy where agents have differential in-
formation about the quality of goods. Differential information gen-
erates specific patterns of net-trades where media of exchange are
essential. We provide a rigorous definition of a medium of exchange.
We prove the following results: (1) Media of exchange do not exist
in economies with symmetrically informed agents. (2) Media of ex-
change improve the efficiency of the economy. (3) In the presence of
some form of auditing, physical goods can be replaced by tokens as
media of exchange. The reverse need not hold.
Keywords: Monetary Theory, Media of Exchange, Differential In-
formation Economies, Optimal Contracts.
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1 Introduction
Some of the oldest and most fundamental questions in monetary theory con-
cern the use of media of exchange. Among these questions are the following:
(1) What is a medium of exchange?
(2) Under what circumstances do media of exchange arise?
(3) Do media of exchange improve the efficiency of the economy?
(4) Can an intrinsically worthless good serve as a medium of exchange?
The paper provides a model which answers these and additional questions.
Smith (1776), Jevons (1875), and Wicksell (1911) have investigated the
use, the role and the characteristics of media of exchange. They have argued
that particular trading patterns arise because trade between agents is sub-
ject to frictions. One such friction arises because trade is not centralized.
For example, Jevons (1875, pp. 3-4) notes that
u
the first difficulty of barter-
is to find two persons whose disposable possessions mutually suit each oth-
ers wants. There may be many people wanting, and many possessing those
things wanted; but to allow of an act of barter there must be a double co-
incidence, which rarely happens." Jevons concludes that in the absence of
a double coincidence of wants, agents will tend to use one particular good
on one side of many exchanges. They acquire this good not for consump-
tion purposes but instead to use it in future trades. Such a good is called a
medium of exchange. 1
Does the decentralized, pairwise trading described by Jevons cause a fric-
tion which leads to a medium of exchange? To answer this question con-
sider the following example by Wicksell, of an economy with three agents
i = 1,2,3, and three goods j = 1,2,3. Each agent i possesses good j = i.
However, agent 1 only likes good 2, agent 2 only likes good 3, and agent 3
only likes good 1. Thus, there is an absence of double coincidence of wants
in pairwise trading. Nevertheless, in the absence of any additional friction,
the agents can agree to execute the following pairwise trades. Each agent i
promises to deliver good i to the agent who likes good i. Trade is conducted
with the understanding that agent i will receive the good agent i likes from
the person who possesses it. Using such implicit "credit arrangements" trade
can be executed without the use of a medium of exchange. Thus, in order to
^he ideas contained in the paragraph have a long history. John Chipman informs us
that clear statements of these ideas go back at least to John Law (1705).
explain why media of exchange are essential for the functioning of the econ-
omy a lack of double coincidence of wants is not sufficient and an additional
friction is needed.
In our model we consider an economy where trade between agents is
pairwise. However, as an additional friction we propose that goods are of
uncertain quality and agents are differentially informed about their quality.
We show that differential information leads to patterns of trade in which
goods are acquired not for consumption purposes but rather for retrading.
This pattern of trade is an essential feature of the economy. In particular,
it is necessary for the implementation of Pareto efficient and individually
rational allocations. In other words, media of exchange arise not because
of a lack of double coincidence of wants, but as a result of a lack of double
coincidence of information.
In order to provide intuition for why media of exchange arise in our model,
we now give a verbal description of a situation with a lack of double coinci-
dence of information. Consider an economy with three agents i = /, J, K and
three goods. Think of good 1 as cigarettes, and goods 2 and 3 as Romanian
and French wine, respectively. Cigarettes and French wine are of known qual-
ity, whereas Romanian wine can be either good or bad quality. The quality
is known to agents / and A', but it is unknown to agent J . Moreover, agent
J does not like Romanian wine. The endowments are given by e 1 = (5,6,0),
e
J
= (5,0,2) and eh = (5,0,4). Then a pattern of Pareto efficient trades
(derived in Section 4.3) involving no indirect trades (no retrading) is given by
I J K I J K
Trades in the good state Trades in the bad state
Thus, in a Pareto efficient allocation, agent K will receive some Romanian
wine from agent /, and give some French wine to agent J in the good state.
In the bad state agent J does not trade. Agent / will then have the incen-
tive to tell agent J the following: "I gave agent K good quality Romanian
wine. You must therefore give me some cigarettes. In compensation you will
receive French wine from agent A'." Clearly, agent / has the incentive to
make such announcement regardless of the quality of the wine. Similarly,
agent K always has the incentive to tell agent J that the Romanian wine is
of bad quality and consequently agent K need not deliver any French wine to
agent J . Thus, in contrast to the case of symmetric information, differential
information may require some agents to make trades which are contingent
on some information they cannot observe. This induces an incentive prob-
lem which makes implicit credit arrangements without media of exchange
problematic.
How does a medium of exchange resolve this incentive problem? Consider
the following pattern of trade.
I J K I J K
Trades in the good state Trades in the bad state
There is no trade between agents / and J . However, agent J now transfers
cigarettes to agent K who in turn delivers it to agent / if the good state is
announced. In the bad state trade occurs as before. Now agent / does
not gain from misreporting the state to agent J because they never trade.
Moreover, agent K does not gain from misreporting the state to agent J
.
because he/she is compensated in cigarettes for giving up French wine in
the good state. Thus, quid pro quo trade— i.e., goods are directly traded for
other goods and not traded on credit—arises in this example endogenously to
overcome incentive problems and the use of cigarettes as medium of exchange
improves the efficiency of the economy.
There is a considerable literature that models media of exchange. This lit-
erature includes work by Aiyagari and Wallace (1992), Feldman (1973), Free-
man (1989), Harris (1979), Jones (1976), King and Plosser (1986), Kiyotaki
and Wright (1989), Oh (1989), Ostroy and Starr (1974), Townsend (1980),
Townsend (1989), Williamson and Wright (1991). We now survey a number
of these papers that add additional frictions to the pairwise trading restric-
tion. For example, Ostroy and Starr (1974) and (1990) describe one-period
models in which agents trade pairwise at competitively determined prices
with the requirement that trade is quid pro quo. 2 Townsend (1980) considers
an intertemporal model in which spatial separation leads to the use of media
exchange. Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) describe an intertemporal framework
in which agents are randomly matched and goods have different storage costs.
A surprising result of their model is that media of exchange need not be goods
with the least storage costs. Williamson and Wright (1991) add private infor-
mation about the quality of goods to the Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) model.
Our model is closest to the tradition surveyed by Ostroy and Starr (1990).
However, our model differs in a number of ways. First, it does not assume
that trade occurs quid pro quo, rather quid pro quo trade can arise endoge-
nously. Second, it models differential information. Finally, our model differs
from the papers cited above, by employing an optimal contracting framework
as in Townsend (1987) and Townsend (1989).
Our paper is organized as follows. We first describe the differential in-
formation economy. Second, we state a rigorous definition of medium of
exchange based on the idea that a medium of exchange is an object with
the following properties: It is acquired not solely to be consumed but to be
exchanged for some other object and the economy cannot function equally
without it. Third, we provide conditions under which no media of exchange
exist. Fourth, we provide an example of a differential information economy
with a medium of exchange. Fifth, we distinguish between intermediated
sales of goods and the use of goods as media of exchange. Finally, we pro-
2 In their model this means that the value of all net-trades at competitive prices must
be zero.
vide conditions under which an intrinsically worthless good (token) can serve
as a medium of exchange.
2 The Model
Consider an economy with / agents, denoted by i 6 /. There are n consump-
tion goods. Each good is available in one of many possible quality grades. In
particular, the quality of good k is determined by a number q 6 Q. In most
cases Q can be assumed to be a subset of IR+ . Thus, a commodity can be
specified by the underlying physical good fc, k = 1, . . . , n, and its quality q.
There is uncertainty about the quality of the consumption goods. This
is modeled as follows. Let (Q,A, P) be a probability space. For k = 1 n
let qk'.Vt —» Q be random variables, such that ^-(u;) is the quality of good k
in state u. A consumption plan of agent i is given by a mapping x l : Q —* IRn .
Each agent i has an initial endowment given by e x :Q —* JRn .
The information of agent i is given by a measurable partition 3 J-
x
of P..
At the time of trade agent i knows the event of the partition which contains
the true state of the economy u>. 4 Without loss of generality we can assume
that the initial endowment e 1 of agent i is measurable with respect to his/her
information J-
x
. We assume that the preferences of each agent i = 1 /
in state Q given the information T
x
can be represented by a von Neumann
Morgenstern utility function
E u'(a: 1 (a;),...,xn (u;),91 (u;),...,9n (u;)) T* (a>).
3
If Q is finite, then a measurable partition is simply a collection of sets A} , j £ J such
that the union of all sets equals Q, i.e., [J.cj Aj — Q, and such that all sets are pairwise
disjoint, i.e., Aj C\ A^ = 0, for all j ^ k.
In general, a measurable partition of Q is a collection of sets Aj, j £ J , with the following
properties: (a) J is finite or countable; (b) Aj £ A for every j , i.e., the sets are measurable;
(<0 U;€J a j = n; (<0 a j n A * = for a11 i ± k -
4 For example, let Q = {a,6,c,t/}, and assume the information of a particular agent
is given by the partition T — { {a}, {b, c, d) } . If a is the true state of nature, then the
element of T which contains a is {a}. In other words the knows exactly the true state of
nature. On the other hand, assume that 6 is the true state of nature. Then {b,c,d} is the
element of T containing b. Thus, the agent only knows that either 6, c, or d is the true
state of nature.
The economy described above is similar to the differential information
economies described in Radner (1968), Wilson (1978), and Yannelis (1991).
However, the key difference is that trading in our economy must be executed
pairwise. Thus, the trade of agent i is described by the net-trades z lJ with
all other agents j . A collection of net-trades for all agents is feasible if and
only if z ,,J = — z J ' 1 for every z,j"
€
/ Thus, z x,x = for all i. We assume
that a trade z 1 '3 can only be observed by agents i and j. As a consequence,
a trade between two agents does not reveal any information to other agents
and information revelation therefore occurs pairwise. Although we consider a
one period economy, for better intuition we can think of the following timing
of events. First agents sign contracts. In the tradition of Townsend (1987)
we can think of a social planner specifying Pareto efficient and individually
rational contracts. The planner knows the structure of the economy but has
no information on the state of nature. At the time when contracts are signed
agents have only their own information. Agents will agree to a contract if
it is individually rational. Once the contract is signed agents independently
announce their information pairwise and all trades specified by the contract
are executed. 5 Finally, agents consume. At the time of consumption all
agents need not yet be fully informed about the quality of the goods they
own and of those which they have received in the trading period.
3 Optimal Trading Contracts
In the presence of differential information arbitrary net-trades are not im-
plementable since agents have an incentive to misreport their information.
Moreover, in our economy agents trade pairwise and information revealed in
each of the pairwise trades is not revealed to any other agent. As a con-
sequence, it is possible for any agent to make different reports to different
trading partners. In the following definition we introduce an incentive con-
straint which ensures that each agent i reveals, his/her information truthfully
5We assume that agents cannot renege on their contracts. Thus, there is ex-post en-
forcement by the social planner. It is important to note that if contracts are incentive
compatible as described in the next section, the social planner need not have any infor-
mation in order to enforce the contracts.
in all of his/her trades.'
Definition 1. Let z1 '3
,
j £ I be a collection of net-trades for agent i. Let
e
l be the initial endowment of agent i. Then the net-tirades are Bayesian
incentive compatible if and only if
(i) z x 'J is T
x
V J7j -measurable 7 for all j £ /;
(ii)
Ti \U)\
> E cv)+^^'(^) >9 (W : Ti (w), 1)
for every oj £ 0., and for all us J £ Fj(u}), where Fj{u) is the element of
the partition T2 which contains Co. 8
Condition (i) means that the two agents can execute the trade z t,J with the
information available to the two agents. Condition (ii) specifies that truthful
revelation of information is optimal. The left-hand side of inequality (1)
is the expected utility of agent i from truthful reporting given the agent's
information. The right-hand side of (1) is the expected payoff if agent i
reports Co3 in his/her trade with agent j. As a consequence, the net-trade
z
t,3 (Co3 ) is executed. The condition u3 £ Fj(Co) means that agent j is not able
to detect the misreport. 9
6The incentive constraint introduced in Definition 1 is an adaptation of the Bayesian
incentive constraint in Myerson (1984, p 74).
7 T{ V Tj is the partition generated by the partitions T, and Tj (intuitively, it is the
union of the two partitions). T
x
V J^-measurability of z1,3 means that :'> is a constant
function on each element of the partition J7
,
V 'F
}
.
formally, Fj(u) = fVg^, f^ F -
9We do not allow misreports in trades between agents i and j which one of the agents
can immediately detect. For example, assume there are two states a and 6, which both
agents i and j can observe. Assume the true state is a. Then it is by assumption not
possible, say for agent i, to report that the true state is 6. What mechanism can exclude
such misreports? For example, assume that information can be revealed in court although
at a high cost of "effort." Then the court can penalize agent i and compensate agent
j. Consequently, i has no incentive not to go to court and agent j will therefore report
truthfully. Moreover, the court is not needed in an optimal contract, if court and effort costs
In the following we characterize optimal contracts between agents. These
are trades between the agents which are Bayesian incentive compatible for
each agent, individually rational and Pareto efficient. 10
Definition 2. An optimal contract between the agents consists of a collection
of net-trades z 1,] with the following properties:
(i) (feasibility) z l 'J = -z J '* for all i,j G /.
(ii) (individual rationality)
E T
x
> E u (e\q) Ti (w)
for each consumer i and for every state uj £ Q.
(Hi) (Incentive compatibility) The trades z'' J
,
j € J are Bayesian incentive
compatible for every consumer i.
(iv) (Pareto efficiency) There does not exist a collection of net-trades z' ,J
which fulfill conditions (i), (ii), and (Hi) and such that
E >)>E Ti (w),
for all agents i — 1,...,7 and for all u G il, with the strict inequality
holding for at least one agent i on a set of positive measure.
We now continue with an example that illustrates how to determine the
structure of optimal contracts. The detailed computations involve only ele-
mentary algebra and can be found in the Appendix.
Example 1. Assume there are two agents denoted by I and J. There
are three consumption goods, however, there is product uncertainty only
about good number two. The initial endowments of agents I and J are
given by e 1 = (5,4,0) and e J = (5,0,2), respectively. Let Q = {g,b} and
^({d}) = P{{b}) = 0-5. Let q2{g) = 1 and 92(6) = 0. Thus, q2 assumes the
are sufficiently high. We therefore abstract from misreports which can be detected and do
not include a verification mechanism in the Pareto problem for simplicity of exposition.
10The notions of Pareto efficiency and individual rationality are similar to those in
Yannelis (1991, Definitions 3.1.2 and 3.1.3).
values and 1 with probability 0.5 each. The utility function of both agents
is given by u(xi, x 2 , J3, q\, f/2, (J3) = %i + \/<j2 x 2 + £3. The information sets of
the agents are given by T\ = {{g}, {b}}, and Tj — {{</, b) }. In this example,
optimal contracts have the following structure: No-trade of goods two and
three occurs in the good state (g). In the bad state (6), agent J trades one
unit of good three to agent /.
There are also examples in which no trade occurs. In particular, choose
e^ = 2 for the initial endowment of agent / instead of e !3 = leaving all other
parameters from Example 1 unchanged. Then we can use similar arguments
as in Example 1 to show that no-trade of goods two and three will occur in
the good state. However, since the marginal rates of substitution of both
agents in the bad state are the same, there are no gains from trading in the
bad state. Hence agents will not trade and consume their initial endowment.
4 Media of Exchange
4.1 Definition of Media of Exchange
There are various definitions of what constitutes a medium of exchange.
We list briefly the most important definitions. In particular, a medium of
exchange is
(1) an object with a high transaction velocity;
(2) an object which is on one side of many exchanges;
(3) an object generally acceptable in trade;
(4) an object which is taken in exchange only to be exchanged for some other
object;
Definition 4 can be found in Jevons (1875) and Wicksell (1911). According to
Wicksell (1911, p. 15) a medium of exchange is "an object which is taken in
exchange, not for its own account, i.e. not to be consumed by the receiver or
to be employed in technical production, but to be exchanged for something
else within a longer or shorter period of time. 1 * Our definition is based on
this insight. We now formalize in our model what it means for a good to be
exchanged only for the purpose of retrading it. In particular, let z' J be a
collection of net-trades for all agents. Then for every agent i and for every
good k we define a notion of a trade velocity.
Definition 3. Agent i 's trade velocity of good k in state to given the net-
trades z l 'J is defined by
«i(^H =EKJH/|E^H|. ( 2 )
i€/ i€/
i/Yljei r[
J
( <x
'
,
)
=
^' en u' e 5e/l
^fc (
2l
'J
) (w ) — 1; otherwise, if the denomina-
tor is zero and the numerator is nonzero we define v'k (z
l,J
) (ui) = oo.
In our model all goods are consumption goods. However, it is possible
that a particular good is traded in excess of its consumption need. In such
a case, the trade velocity (velocity as in Definition 3) is strictly greater than
one. If a good is only traded by an agent for purposes other than consumption
(i.e, Yljei zk
3
(u ) ~ 0) then the velocity of this good is infinite. Thus, our
definition of a medium of exchange will require that the velocity is strictly
greater than one. However, our definition requires an additional property
which is not contained in the definition of Wicksell. Consider the following
example:
Example 2. There are three agents /, J, A' in an economy with no
uncertainty. There is only one consumption good. Consider the follow-
ing pairwise trades: z I,J — z ,A = z h,! — 1. Clearly, feasibility requires
z
J,i
_
..A,J
_ z
i,h
_
_^ Obviously, all net-trades cancel each other out at
the individual and aggregate level, and thus they implement the only opti-
mal allocation in this economy (i.e, Pareto efficient and individually rational
allocation). The velocity, however, for each agent is infinite.
Strictly speaking the good in Example 2 classifies as a medium of exchange
according to WickseH's definition. However, the economy can clearly function
equally without good one being traded. If the good is not traded it has a
velocity of one and does not qualify any more as a medium of exchange. A
similar argument as in Example 2 can be made for all goods in any three or
more agent economy. As a consequence, if the velocity of a good is our only
element of a definition of medium of exchange, all goods will automatically
qualify as a medium of exchange. A definition of medium of exchange must
therefore be based on an additional requirement. In particular, if a good
is a medium of exchange then it is an object -which is acquired not solely to
be consumed but to be exchanged for some other object; and the economy
10
cannot function equally without it. In our model, this means that retrading
is essential to implement a particular optimal allocation.
In Definition 4 we formalize what we mean by the statement that retrad-
ing is essential in the economy. In particular, it should not be possible to
replace the original trades by alternative trades which implement the same
allocation and which do not require the good to be a medium of exchange.
We now give our definition.
Definition 4. Let z' J be an optimal contract in a differential information
economy. Then good k is a medium of exchange if and only if the following
two conditions hold:
(i) There exists an agent £ £ I such that v :k (z
t0 ){u) > 1 on a set of positive
measure;
(n) There does not exist an optimal contract z 1 '3 with
(a) Hjei = 1J = Eje/ ~'"7 for ail agents i 6 I;
(b) z]^ = z\£ for all goods m for which there exists an agent i such that
(c) vU5,J )(w ) = l a - e - f°' <l,! a9ents ! e 7 -
Condition (i) requires that a medium of exchange has a velocity greater
than one. Condition (ii) formalizes the idea that the economy cannot function
equally without the medium of exchange. In particular, condition (a) requires
that the alternative trades result in the same allocation, (b) is important in
cases with more than one medium of exchange. For example, assume that
there are two goods which are perfect substitutes which are both traded with
a velocity greater than one. Then it is always possible to make all trades with
velocity greater than one in only one of the goods. Consequently without (b)
no good which has a sufficiently good substitute will classify as a medium of
exchange, (c) states that the velocity of good k is one for all agents. 11
4.2 Some Elementary Results
In this section we collect some elementary results which follow immediately
from the definition.
"Definition 4 can easily be extended to more general spaces of contracts. For example,
we need not assume that contracts are Pareto efficient. Ail of the results still go through
under this more general specification.
11
Fact 1. No medium of exchange exists if the endowment is already an optimal
allocation.
Fact 2. No medium of exchange exists in any economy with less than three
agents.
Fact 3. No medium of exchange exists in economies with symmetrically
informed agents.
Proof. If the endowment is already Pareto efficient, then the endowment itself
is an optimal allocation. Thus, the optimal allocation can be implemented
by the trivial trades z[J = for all goods k. Thus, vk (z
t,J
) = 1 for all goods.
Thus, condition (ii) of Definition 4 implies that no good is a medium of
exchange. This proves Fact 1.
Fact 2 follows immediately from the fact that there is at most one net-
trade per agent in these economies. Hence the velocity of all goods must be
one.
We now show Fact 3. Let z l ' J be an arbitrary collection of net-trades.
Then we can define for any good k new net-trades z lJ with velocity one by
using the following construction:
Let z
l
f!
J denote the net-trades in good k. Then define the new net-trades
z)* as follows: Let P = {i £ / | Ej€ /4'J > 0}, and let N = {i £ I \
£j€/ c[J < 0}. For all agents i $ PU N and for all j £ I define z
l
k
J
- 0. For
every i £ P now define q, = Yijei C 1-' J / Hie/3 2Zj€/ ~a.
J
-
Similarly, for every
i £ N define a, = Yljei *k I HieN YL^i ~k For all agents i we now define
the alternative trades
5
iJ
= / -Cfi Zrei 4'
r
^ (iJ)e iVxP or (i,j) £ P x N;
\ z
1
^ = otherwise.
By construction the net-trades are feasible and Ylj^i ~[-'
J
— Hje/ z%k f° r ^
agents i £ I. We now check that the velocity of good k is 1 for all agents.
The assertion follows immediately for agents i' (£ P U N . We now show it
for agents i £ P. Note that by construction z
1
^ > for all i £ P and for all
j £ L Thus, the numerator and the denominator in the definition of velocity
are the same. The argument for agents i £ N is similar.
Finally, it remains to prove that z l 'J is Bayesian incentive compatible
and T
x
V .^--measurable. Since agents' information is symmetric, z 1,3 is T{-
measurable for all i £ I. Since z l 'J is a composition of functions z lJ it is Tx ,
12
and hence J-
x
V jF
;
-measurable. Finally, because of symmetric information
T{ — J~j and hence every agent can verify all of his/her net-trades. Misreports
are consequently not possible.
The facts above list cases in which our intuition tells us that media of
exchange serve no purpose. These cases consider extreme preference pat-
terns, endowment patterns, differential information patterns, and numbers
of agents. In each case our definition accords with intuition.
We now discuss Facts 1 to 3 and indicate how they fit into existing thought
in monetary economics.
Remark 1. Fact 1 reflects the broader truth that selfish agents do not
trade if endowments are Pareto efficient. It also reflects the need for frictions
in monetary economics as discussed in Remark 2 below. Similarly, Fact 2
verifies an additional case where a medium of exchange should not exist.
Remark 2. Fact 3 provides a rigorous proof of a Folk Theorem in monetary
economics. The Folk Theorem is that some friction is needed to explain
media of exchange. In our case trading frictions arise as a consequence of
differential information. It is also important to note that full information
is a special case of symmetric information. Thus, Fact 3 indicates that no
medium of exchange exists in a full information economy. As a consequence,
"Wicksell triangles" [cf., Wicksell (1911, pp. 16ff) or Niehans (1978, p. 101)]
do not require media of exchange in the absence of an additional friction.
In order to illustrate this point consider the following simple example by
Wicksell (1911, pp. 16ff).
Assume that there are three countries i — 1,2,3. There are three goods.
Each country i is endowed with one unit of good i. Country i only likes
good i + 1 mod(3). 12 Thus, in the Pareto efficient allocation each country i
consumes one unit of good i
-f 1 mod(3). In Wicksell (1911) this allocation
is implemented by having one country serve as an intermediary. For exam-
ple, choose county 1 as the intermediary. Then the net-trades between the
countries are given by z1 '2 = (0,1,-1), z 1,3 = (-1,0,1) and z 2 >3 = (0,0,0). 13
Clearly, good 3 has a velocity greater than one. Alternatively, however, the
12That is, country 1 likes good 2, country 2 likes good 3, and county 3 likes good 1.
13The remaining trades follow from feasibility. In particular, z 2,1 = (0,-1,1), r 3,1
(1,0,-1) and c 3 ' 2 = (0,0,0).
13
trades z 1 '2 = (0,1,0), z h2 = (-1,0.0) and z 2 '3 = (0,0,1) also implement the
allocation. Thus, according to definition 4 no good is a medium of exchange.
In his model, Wicksell (1911) assumes that trade must be pairwise and
quid pro quo, i.e., goods can only be swapped for each other. In our model,
however, agents can receive goods "on credit." For example, agent 1 gives
his endowment to agent 3 without immediate compensation, but with the
understanding that he/she will receive one unit of good 2 from agent 2. In
other words, although trade is executed pairwise it is agreed upon by all
agents. In the case of full information the pairwise trading assumption does
not impose any additional restriction in our framework. However, in the
case of differential information the pairwise trading restriction implies that
information is only revealed pairwise. This information revelation mecha-
nism differs substantially from mechanisms where information revelation is
centralized.
4.3 An Economy with a Medium of Exchange
In section 4.2 we established some general results on non existence of media
of exchange. In this section we provide a simple example of a differential
information economy with a medium of exchange, thus showing that Defini-
tion 4 is not vacuous. In particular, we prove the existence of a good which
is a medium of exchange for one of the consumers.
The example illustrates an important proposition in monetary economics.
The proposition is that the use of a medium of exchange increases the effi-
ciency of the economy. In our framework this proposition can be rephrased
as follows: There is an optimal allocation that cannot be achieved without
a medium of exchange. To prove that media of exchange are necessary to
achieve all optimal allocations, it is clear that the economies described in
Section 4.2. must be ruled out.
The main idea of the example is as follows: We consider an economy with
three agents /, J, A' with a lack of double coincidence of information between
some agents. In such a situation trade will tend to occur in goods about
which agents share common information. This leads to a particular pattern
of trade in which a good which is recognizable by all agents functions as a
medium of exchange. In particular, agent J has no information about good
two. Good two can be either of good or bad quality. Since in the absence
of informational problems goods two and three are perfect substitutes, A'
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acquires more of good two from agent /, in order to trade some of good three
to agent J if good two is of good quality. If the quality of good two is bad,
then there is no trade between agents / and J. In order to ensure that K
announces the state truthfully in the trade with agent J, good one must be
used as medium of exchange.
Example S. 14
I J K J K
Trades in state u = g Trades in state u: = b
Assume that there are three agents denoted by I,J,K. There arc three
goods. Endowments are given by e 1 — (5,6,0), e J = (5,0,2), and e =
(5,0,4). There is uncertainty about the quality of good two but no uncer-
tainty about goods one and three. Then q x = q3 = 1. We now describe
q2 . Let Vt = {#,6} and let P{{g}) = P{{b}) = 0.5. We assume that
^2(9) — 1 and Q2(k>) = 0. All agents have the same utility function given
by u(xi, £2, £3, <7i, (72, 93) = X\ + \fq-2X2 + x 3- The information of the agents is
given by T\ = Tk — {{g}, (M}i an<^ 3~J = {{y^}}- In other words, agents
/ and K have full information whereas agent J has no information about the
quality of good two.
We now show that the following collection of net-trades describe an op-
timal contract: z ! 'J {uj) = (0,0,0) for u = g,b; zLK {g) = (y/E - 2,-2,0),
I4This example corresponds to the example discussed in the introduction. However, we
assume that agent J also likes good 2 in order to show that the result does not. depend
upon a very specific choice of utility function. It should be clear to the reader that the
same result holds if agent J does not derive utility from good 2.
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ziX(b) = (-1,0,2), and zJ<K {g) = (v/2 - 2,0,2), 2 J 'A (6) - (0,0,0). First,
verify that the contract is individually rational for each agent. The individual
rationality constraints for agent / are
5 + z[*(g) + yfi + z
l
2
k
\g) > 5 + x/6;
5 + zi'
K
(b) + y/=i>
h\b) > 5.
For agent J the Bayesian individual rationality constraint is
1/2 (.5 + 4h'(9) + \/2 + 4,K (9)) + 1/2 (5 W§) > 5 + >/2.
Finally, the individual rationality constraints for agent K are
5 - z[K {g) - zi'
K
{g) + y/A - z^'(g) -^) > 5 + v^;
5 - z[K (b) + \/4-z^(b) > 5 + y/i.
Second, we must verify that the contract is incentive compatible. Be-
cause there is no trade between agent / and agent J, we only need to check
the incentive constraint for agent K. Moreover, note that agent K cannot
misreport to agent / because they both have symmetric information. These
constraints are given by
5- zi'K (9) - ziJ< (g) + \A - 4>K {g) - ziK {g)
5- 4K (b) + \A - 4K {b)
>5-z'l 'K (b)-z{'K {g) + y/i-i
It is straightforward to check that the constraints hold for the contract speci-
fied above. Finally, we check that the contract is Pareto efficient. First, note
that the final allocation in our example is Pareto efficient under complete
information. If the contracts are not Pareto efficient then there must exist
a state u G Q and an alternative contract such that all agents can be made
better off in state lo. However this violates the fact that the final allocation
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derived from the original contract is Pareto efficient under full information. 15
Since we have established that z l 'J is an optimal contract we can analyze
whether one (or more) of the three goods is a medium of exchange. Clearly,
the velocities of goods two and three is one for all agents and for all states.
However, note that the velocity of good one of agent K in state lj — g is
given by vK {z x 'J )){g) = {V& - \/2) / (4 - s/l- v/6), and hence vK {z^))(g) >
1. In order to establish that good one is a medium of exchange for agent
K it remains to prove that we cannot find an optimal contract z'' J which
implements the same allocation and for which v^(z1,j )(uj) = 1 for all lo and
for all agents k. Note that any trade with velocity one for agent K implies
trade between agents / and J. Denote this trade by z{ . Moreover, we
must have z{ (g) ^ z{ (6). Furthermore, note that by definition the trade
in all other goods must remain the same. Hence, z I,J (g) = (r, '
v
(</), 0, 0)
and z I,J (b) = (0,0,0). However, such trades are not Bayesian incentive
compatible. In particular, agent / will always announce the state u> with
u = arg maXygjj z1 ' (uj). Thus, it is essential to have v h {z' J )){g) > 1 in the
optimal contract. Consequently good one is a medium of exchange.
In the above example agent A' is an intermediary in trade between agents
/ and J. In particular, there is no trade between agents / and J and agent
15 FormalIy, Pareto efficiency can be derived. as follows. We evaluate whether there
are Pareto improvements from the conjectured optimal contract. Therefore, consider the
following optimization problem
max l/2v/2TT7+ 1/2x74 + x, + l/2yi + l/2y2 ,
subject to (1) s/'2- j-i/2- yi /2 = \/2.
(2) y/A - x 2/2 - y2/2 = 2.
This problems maximizes the expected utility of agent J subject only to the individual
rationality constraints of agents / and K in the bad state (1) and in the good state (2).
Without loss of generality, we treat agents / and A' symmetrically. After inserting (1) and
(2) into the objective, the first order conditions are
1 11 1
and
2>/2 + xi 2 N/2-x 1 /2 2x/4 + j 2 2^/4 - a- 2 /2
-
One can immediately verify that ij = i' 2 = is the only solution. Thus, the proposed
allocation is Pareto efficient in the absence of the incentive constraints. Therefore it is
Pareto efficient with the incentive constraints.
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J receives all of his/her goods via agent K . The existence of a medium
of exchange for agent K and his/her role as an intermediary are inherently
linked in example 3.
4.4 Intermediation versus Media of Exchange
In most economies a substantial fraction of trade runs through intermediaries.
For example, goods are often traded on a retail basis rather than purchased
wholesale. In our terminology, such goods have a velocity greater than one.
In most circumstances, however, these goods would not be considered to
be media of exchange. In order to distinguish between intermediated sale
of goods and media of exchange, we must refine definition 4. This is the
purpose of this section.
How does intermediated trade arise in our model? Consider the following
example.
Example 4.
I J K I J K111 111
Trades in state uj — r Trades in state u = u
Assume that there are three agents i = I.J,I\ and two goods. The
endowments are not state-contingent and are given by e 1 — (1,0), e J = e =
(1, 1). There is uncertainty about the quality of good 2. For example, think
of good 2 as watermelons, which can be either ripe (r) or unripe (u). Thus,
let Q = {r,u) and </2(^) — ^ f° r w = r,u. Assume that each state occurs
with equal probability. Agent / can determine whether a watermelon is ripe
or unripe, i.e., Ti — {{r}, {w}}. On the other hand, agents J and K cannot
determine the quality of watermelons, i.e., J-j = Tk = {{r, u}}. The utility
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functions of the agents / are given by u (x\,xi,q) = X\ and
L x
-
! otherwise. L x x + x 2 otherwise.
An optimal allocation in this economy is given by x (r) = x 7 (u) = (1,0),
x
J (r) = xK(u) = (1,2), and x J (u) = x h'{r) = (1,0).
How can this allocation be implemented? Since agents J and K have no
information they cannot achieve this allocation without the help of agent /.
Since agent / does not like watermelons (good 2) he/she can intermediate the
trade without any incentive problems. Thus, the following trades constitute
an optimal contract. In state r, the trades are given by z l 'J {r) = (0,-1),
r 7 'A (r) = (0,1); in state u the opposite occurs. There is no pairwise trade
between agents ./ and K.
Clearly, v^z'^) = oo in both states, however, is good 2 really a medium
of exchange in example 4? In fact, good 2 is traded only for its own sake, not
to facilitate trade in other goods. Moreover, trade in good 2 does not occur
for incentive reasons. In this sense there is intermediated trade in good 2.
however, good 2 is not a medium of exchange. We now introduce a refined
version of Definition 4 which distinguishes between intermediation and media
of exchange. In our refined definition a good is a medium of exchange if it
is traded with a velocity in excess of consumption needs and if the economy
cannot function equally without it. We now refine what it means for a good
to be traded in excess of its consumption needs. In particular, we define
trades with minimum velocity.
Definition 5. Let z'' 3 be an optimal contract. Then z' J has minimum
velocity in good k if and only if the following does not hold: There exists
net-trades z^ in good k with
(i) E ; g/ zk J = Ei€/ Zk 3 for aU ^ents i;
(ii) z%J is Tx V J-j -measurable for all agents i, j
;
(Hi) vl(z^J )(u>) < v^z
1
^)^) for all agents i, where the strict inequality holds
on a set of positive measure for at least one agent.
Conditions (i) and (iii) state that a trade has minimum velocity provided
it is not possible to statewise reduce the velocity further without changing
the allocation. Condition (ii) reflects the requirement that agents must, trade
1!)
on their available information. It does not require that trades are incentive
compatible.
In our refined definition, a medium of exchange is also a good that fa-
cilitates trade in some other goods. In our model this happens because a
medium of exchange reduces the incentive problems in exchange. If a good is
therefore not traded with more than minimum velocity, it does not qualify as
a medium of exchange. This leads us to the following strengthened version of
Definition 4. Note that Definition 6 can be derived from Definition 4 simply
by replacing the terms "velocity one" by "minimum velocity."
Definition 6. Let z lJ be an optimal contract in a differential information
economy. Then good k is a strong medium of exchange if and only if the
following two conditions hold:
(i) z t,J does not have minimum velocity in good k.
(ii) There does not exist an optimal contract z lJ with
(a ) Hjei ='' J = Ejg/ ~'' ; for all agents i £ I;
(b)
^m ~ zm for n^ goods m for which z
l,J does not have minimum ve-
locity.
(c) z tJ has minimum velocity in good k.
Remark 3. If a good is a strong medium of exchange (according to Defini-
tion 6) then it is also a medium of exchange (according to Definition 4). As
a consequence Facts 1, 2, and 3 still hold for strong media of exchange.
We now reexamine Examples 3 and 4. In example 3, the minimum ve-
locity in any good is 1. This follows for the following reasons. First, trades
can be reduced to velocity one trade by the argument used in the proof of
Fact 3. Second, the resulting net-trades are JF, V JF, measurable, since the
joint information of each pair of agents corresponds to full information, i.e.,
J~i V J-j — {{g},{6}} for all agents i,j 6 /• Thus, Definition 6 and Defini-
tion 4 and hence the two concepts coincide for example 3.
Finally, reconsider example 4. Note that the velocity cannot be reduced
any further. In order to reduce the velocity, it would be necessary to have
z
J
'
h
=fz 0. Furthermore, z ' must be state contingent. This is impossible
since both agents have only trivial information. Hence, the original trades
have minimum velocity and neither good is a strong medium of exchange.
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4.5 Tokens and Credit as Media of Exchange
This section addresses the question whether intrinsically worthless goods
(tokens) can serve as media of exchange. Proposition 1 in this section estab-
lishes that intrinsically worthless goods in zero-net supply (credit) can serve
as media of exchange at least as well or better than goods with an intrinsic
value. Finally, we show that a government that issues tokens and commits
to collecting the tokens at the end of the period (as in Gale (1978)) can be
used as a substitute for the credit mechanism.
We start with a technical Lemma.
Lemma 1. Let z[.'J be a collection ofTx V J-j -measurable net-trades in good
k. Then there exist ^V J-j -measurable net-trades z['J with minimum velocity
such that Yljel ~1-
J
=
^jG/ 2fcJ for a^ agents i.
Proof. See Appendix.
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section.
Proposition 1. Assume that the utility functions of all agents are monotone.
Furthermore, assume that there exists a good k which is in zero net-supply
and from which agents do not derive utility. If a differential information
economy has a strong medium of exchange, then good k is also a strong
medium of exchange.
Proof. Without loss of generality let z l,J be an optimal contract for which
good 1 is a strong medium of exchange. Let good 2 be in zero net-supply, i.e..
k = 2. If good 2 is a strong medium of exchange for zM
,
then the Proposition
follows. Therefore consider the case where in which good 2 is not a strong
medium of exchange. It will be shown that it is possible to construct an
alternative optimal contract z lJ that achieves the same allocation and for
which good 2 is a strong medium of exchange. There are two subcases to
consider as good 2 can fail to be a strong medium of exchange for z' J in two
ways. Either good 2 already has minimum velocity or there is an alternative
optimal contract z t,J that achieves the same allocation and for which good 2
has minimum velocity. It the follows that either z'
2
J
= or z
lJ
= as good 2
is in zero net supply and has minimum velocity.
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In what follows we analyze the first subcase as an identical argument
established the result for the second subcase. We now define an alterna-
tive contract z lJ as follows. First, let z\'J be trades with minimum velocity
in good one which achieve the original allocation. Such contracts exist by
Lemma 1. We now define z^ — z\ : — z\ J . Finally, define z\£ = z\£ for
m > 2. Consequently, z'° and z lJ implement the same allocation. We next
verify that z lJ is Bayesian incentive compatible.
Assume by way of contradiction that there exists a state u, and states
<ZJ G Ej(lj) such that
> E Tr (u).
Since negative consumption of any good is impossible we must have
e
l
'(u;) + X;^V')e^+- (4)
Since good 2 is in zero net-supply e'2 (ij) = 0. Thus, 5Zj€ / ^2'
J
( U-'
J
) — because
of (4). Monotonicity of the utility function and (4) therefore imply
r /
E -
-
\
= E
:
= E
-_
> E
_
w
u c;(u;) +2 ilJ (u>') + #'(#) ,0,...,«r(u;) ^
i€/
u(ci(u;) + j:5;j'(a>''),E 5Ji."-^M) I* w
(w)
u (ci(W ) + ^ [5j
j
'(«o + *jV)j ,;r ^, • • • ,?m ] I ^i (a>)
(5)
The first equality follows from the definition of i !J and from the fact that
z
1
^
3
= for all i,j. The second equality follows since agents do not derive
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utility from good 2. The inequality holds because of monotonicity. 16 In-
equalities (3) and (5), and the fact that z l,J and z l 'J implement the same
allocation, 1 ' immediately imply that the z l 'J is not Bayesian incentive com-
patible, a contradiction. Thus, z l,J fulfills Bayesian incentive compatibility.
Finally, it remains to prove that good 2 is a strong medium of exchange for
z
l,J
. Assume by way of contradiction that good 2 is not a strong medium of
exchange. Then by Definition 6 we can find an alternative optimal contract
z
1
'3 which implements the same allocation as z l,J and which has minimum
velocity in good 2. By construction, z UJ has minimum velocity in good 1.
Consequently, Definition 6 implies that z' J has minimum velocity in good 1
as well. This, however, is a contradiction to the fact that good 1 is a strong
medium of exchange with respect to the original contract z lJ . Consequently,
good 2 is a strong medium of exchange for the optimal contract f !,J . This
concludes the proof.
Proposition 1 shows that a good which is intrinsically worthless can be
used as a medium of exchange, provided the good is in zero net-supply.
For this result to hold it is crucial that the consumption set is JR^_. As a
consequence the consumption of all goods must be positive. This assumption
does not require much justification if a physical good is traded, however, if
a good is in zero net-supply the positivity assumption requires a different
interpretation. In particular, trading a good which is in zero net-supply
means trading 10 Us (promises to pay the good) since the physical good itself
is not available in positive quantities and therefore cannot be traded directly.
The positivity constraint therefore implies that even after misreports, an
agent cannot hold net-debt obligations towards other agents.
In the absence of any outside enforcement mechanism (such as auditing),
any agent can cover claims against him/herself by writing additional lOUs
and thus exiting as a net debtor. 18 Thus, it is necessary to have an auditing
16
In particular, since £^,5^ > °. we Set e 'i(-') +Ej€ / l*iJ (^ ) + ^ (*j
Y2jcj z\'3 (<*'' ) . Thus, the assertion follows from monotonicity of u.
17Since z''3 and 5' J implement the same allocation, it follows that E
£i6/ zij'(u;) )9(u,)) |^].(u)) = £[«(e'(u,0 + E; e/^i (w)-?(w))
l60bviously, the debt-p
some agents will be left i
already left the economy.
>e\M +
u e'w +
Ti (")•
'^O ositions of some other agents cannot clear. As a consequence
as creditors with uncovered claims. By that time debtors have
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mechanism which verifies whether or not an agent is a net debtor after trade.
This, however, requires verifying and recording each agent's trade with all
other agents. This already requires substantial local auditing. From here it
is only a small step to centralized auditing. In particular, all that is required
is a meeting of all local auditors where trading records are compared. Such
a mechanism completely eliminates the pairwise revelation of information.
It corresponds to a mechanism where all agents must first publicly agree on
the "true" state of nature and trades are then executed accordingly. Such a
mechanism does not require a medium of exchange.
We now describe an alternative mechanism which requires relatively little
auditing. In particular, each agent ? receives m, > units of a common token
good with no intrinsic value. 19 The m l units can be interpreted as a "loan"
which must be returned in full after trade. This requires an auditor who
collects m
l
units of tokens from agent i after trade. It is important to note
that the auditor need not have any information or any record of trades.
Provided m
t
is positive, agents can trade in tokens instead of credit slips.
The positivity constraint is automatically enforced by the auditor since each
agent i must return at least in, units of tokens after trade.
It is important to note that even under the above described mechanism
the good is a pure medium of exchange in the sense that no direct utility
can be derived from consuming the good. As a medium of exchange the
good solely fulfills an implicit accounting function. Furthermore, an intrin-
sic consumption value can interfere with a good's function as a medium of
exchange. Thus, whereas it is possible to replace goods by tokens as media
of exchange, it is in general not possible to replace tokens by goods without
a loss of Pareto efficiency.
5 Concluding Remarks
The paper started with four specific questions. We conclude the paper by
discussing these questions in the light of our model and the results. We also
indicate some additional questions which the model can address.
(1) The definition of a medium of exchange is based on the insight of Wick-
sell (1911). However, we require an additional condition which formalizes
19The mechanism also works if each agent i receives exactly the same amount of tokens.
Thus, the total amount of tokens (provided it is positive) does not have any real effects.
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the idea that a medium of exchange is "essential", i.e., the economy cannot
function equally without it.
(2) In our model media of exchange arise because of a lack of double coinci-
dence of information rather than just a lack of double coincidence of wants.
In particular, Fact 3 in Section 4.2 shows that differential information is
crucial.
(3) In our model media of exchange improve the efficiency of the economy.
Thus, there are optimal allocations that cannot be achieved without media
of exchange. Example 3 illustrates this point.
(4) In our model intrinsically worthless goods can serve as media of exchange
under certain conditions. Proposition 1 and the mechanism described there-
after show that a worthless good in the presence of decentralized auditing
functions at least as well as any other good as a medium of exchange. This
is because these goods serve only an accounting role. It is interesting to note
that whereas a token good can always replace a physical good as a medium
of exchange, the reverse is not true. In particular, as we point out in Sec-
tion 4.5, the fact that a good has an intrinsic value can interfere with its
function as a medium of exchange. Thus, tokens cannot always be replaced
by goods with intrinsic value as a medium of exchange.
This observation is interesting in connection with the often heard asser-
tion that the fact that a government issues and collects taxes in tokens implies
that these tokens will be used by the public as a medium of exchange. It
is not immediately obvious why this assertion should be true. In particular,
agents could pay the government taxes in tokens and use a different good
as a medium of exchange. However, as we have pointed out. in our model
circulating the tokens reduces the incentive problems in the economy and
thus has a Pareto improving effect.
We expect that our model will be useful in addressing additional ques-
tions. Gresham's Law is a particularly interesting example. According to
Jevons (1875, p. 81), Gresham's Law states that bad money drives out good
money and that good money cannot drive out bad money. In our model
and in Jevons (1875) good money can be interpreted as gold coins of known
quality (weight), whereas bad money can be interpreted as gold coins of un-
known quality. The validity of Gresham's Law within our model reduces to
the question of whether a lottery money is at least as good a medium of
exchange as a non-lottery money.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Computations for Example 1
Since agent / has complete information, an optimal contract must fulfill two
separate individual rationality constraints: one for the good state and the
other one for the bad state. In particular, we get
5 + z[-\g) + v/4 + z
l
2
'
J
{g) + z? {g) > 7, (.41
)
for the good state and
5 + 4'
J
(b) + \/:l'
J (b)>5, (A2)
in the bad state. In contrast, agent J has no information and consequently
assigns the probabilities 0.5 to each state. Thus, the individual rationality
constraint of agent J is given by
5 + l/2(-zi'
J
{g)-zi'
J
(b) + J-2 - z'2
J
(g) - z
1/
'(g)
+ sJ-2 - zi'
J
(b)) >5 + v/2. (A3;
The incentive constraint for agent / which implies truthful revelation of in-
formation in the good state is given by
5 + z[ J (g) + v/4 + zf
J
(g) + z^'(g) > 5 4- z[
J
[b] 4- ^ + zi
J
(b) + z
l
,
J
(b).
(.44)
The incentive constraint for the bad state is given by
5 + z[J {b) + sfzYib) > 5 + z[
J
(g) + yjz^(g). (.45)
Further, feasibility requires —5 < z{ [g),z{ (6) < 5, —4 < z 2 ' [g),z2 (b) <
and < z3 ' (g), z3 ' (b) < 2. In order to find the set of all optimal contracts
we can therefore solve
i
max
7^
-z[<J (g) - z['
J
(b)) + yj2 - z
l/{g) - z 1,
3
(g) + ^2 - z{J (b),
z
\ '
z2 ,Z3
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subject to
z['\g) + \Ji + =2
J
(g) + 4'
J
(g) > 2 + au (A6)
z['
J
{b) +
>
/c3
/ "/
(6) > a 2 , (A7)
and constraints (A4) and (A5), where a u a 2 > is the surplus which agent
/ receives in the optimal contract. First, note that we can assume that
z2
' (b) = —4. It is easy to verify that (A4) never binds. Otherwise, inequal-
ities (A3), (A6), and (AT) cannot all hold. 20 Hence, by reducing z{ (g) we
can ensure that (A6) binds. Furthermore, by reducing z{ (b) we can ensure
that either (A5) or (A7) binds (recall that (A4) never binds). Straightfor-
ward computations yield that (A5) must bind. 21 Thus, by inserting (A5) and
(A6) in the maximizer we get
m
21 ,22,23
»ax y/2-zl'J (g)-zi'J (g) + ^2 - =i'
J
(b)
+ 2^4 + z l2
J
{g) + zi'
J
{g) + y/z^'
J
(b) - yjz l2
'
j
{g), (.48)
subject to the constraints —4 < z 2 {g),z 2 [b) < 0, and < z3 ' (g),z$ (b) <
2. First, note that it is optimal to choose 2:3(6) = 1. It is easy to see
that no interior solution exists for the remaining parameters, in fact leaving
z2 (9) = z3 (d) = as the optimal solution.
22 Hence, agents trade goods
20Assume (A4) holds with equality. Then insert (A6), (A7) and (A4) into the left-hand
side of (A3) and verify that it cannot hold.
21 Assuming that only (A6) and (A7) bind we can show by inserting (A6) and (A7) in the
objective function of the maximization problem and by taking the first order conditions
that an optimum requires z3 ' (b) = 1 and z2 ' (g) + z3 ' (g) — — 1. (A7) then implies that
2j' (6) = 6 — 1 and (A6) implies z
x
'
(g) = 2 + a — v3. We can now insert these values
into (A3) to get 2\/3 — 2 — a — 6 > '2\/L Since a, 6 > 0. this inequality does not hold.
Consequently (A5) must bind.
22This can be seen easily by considering the derivatives of (A8) with respect to z,' (g)
and z3 ' (g). These derivatives are given by
y/4 + z^
J
(9) + 4-
J
(9) 2^2-z'2
J (g)-z!
i
J
(g)
+
^4 + z'2
J
(g) + z'3
J
(9) 2^2-z[ J (g)-:'3 J (g) 2yJ'z'3
J
'
(g]
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two and three only in the bad state. The trades in good one are indeterminate
and can be used to transfer the available surplus between the two agents. For
example, if we choose z{ (g) = and z{ {b) — —1 then all surplus goes to
agent J.
6.2 Proof of Lemma 1
First, define an alternative measure of velocity by
u> +
1
(A9)
In order to find trades with minimum velocity with respect to v it is sufficient
to prove that the trades have minimum velocity with respect to v. 23 Note
that all trades are T = Vi.je/ 3~i V T} — V^/ ^-measurable. Let A n , n G IN
be the collection of sets forming the partition J- . Then every trade z lJ must
be constant on each set A n and can therefore be represented by a sequence
zl;\ ne IN. For i G /, let M,-(w) - v l [z]: : ){u) . Then Mi{u) is T = V i6 /^-
measurable. Thus, we can also represent M,(lj) by a sequence A/
t
n
,
n G IN.
Let 1 = {(t,j)
|
i ± j}, and let £ = {y \ y: 1 x IN -> ^}. Let
Fn = {j/n^ -» iff | Ej€/,j?£«yn(i,j) = Eje/, J?t, ~[
J
,
for every i G 7, and
^'(yn(^j)) 5: M/1 }- Then Fn is a compact subset, of RJ for every n. 24 Since
the weak and the strong topology coincide on the space of sequences. Ty-
chonofF's theorem implies that the set {y G Q \ yn £ I7n} is compact. As a
consequence, the set Z = {y G Q \ yn £ ^n and yn {hj) is constant on the
partition ^ V ^ for all (i,j) G X} is compact.
Now define inductively,
^(i,i) = arg minis ( y ,),
y€2
Consequently, there do not exist values of ;,' (g) and z3 ' (g) for which both derivatives
are zero. Furthermore, the derivatives imply that z2 ' (</) = z3 ' (g) = and z2 ' (</) = 4,
23
' (g) = 2 are the only candidates for solutions to the maximization problem. However,
one can immediately verify that the second candidate solution is not optimal.
23 In fact, the reverse is not true as the reader is invited to check.
24 Since v* is continuous, it follows that the set is closed. Furthermore, the set is bounded
since w*"((yn (i,i)) < M? implies \yn {i,j)\ < M/1 (l + Ejei.j* ^k) for a11 ^J)^ X -
28
and in general
y{ht) = argminu'(yi)
V€3>i.i-i
Then h\ = flte/^i,.) = iV(i,/) > s a compact subset of Q. We define A'n
inductively by
y{nA) = argminu 1 ^),
yGh'-.-i
and in general
y{ntt) = argminu'(y n ),
y€yn ,,-
and Kn = flic/ %»,.) Since I\ n D A'n+1 we get A' = flne/v Kn ^ 0- However,
every contract in A' is by construction a minimum velocity trade. This
concludes the proof.
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